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I. II'TRODLCTION 
The problem of maintaining a secret among II' share-
holders whereby at least t of them are required to 
cooperate before the secret can be reproduced was first 
posed by Shamir ( 1979) and Blakley ( 1979). Since then 
a number of (t, IV) threshold schemes have been suggested 
by researchers in the field of cryptography (Simmons, 
1989), These schemes provide the property that by using 
any t or more pieces of the shared secret, which are 
called shares hereafter. the whole shared secret can be 
derived. while at the same time maintaining that any 
t - 1 or less shares will be insufficient to derive the 
shared secret. The shared secret itself can be a master 
key to a cryptographic system. a vault-lock combination 
or even a decision which must be arrived at by at least 
t members in an organisation. 
A common drawback of these proposed schemes is 
that each time when a shared secret is recovered. all 
shares of the secret, including those which did not 
partici pa te in the recovering process. become useless. 
Therefore each shareholder has to be given a new share 
when a new secret is to be shared. In this paper we 
propose a simple (t. w) threshold scheme based on the 
use of the pseudo-random function family (Goldreich 
et al. 1986) and the universal hash function family 
(Carter and Wegman. 1979; Wegman and Carter, 1981). 
This scheme can remedy the above mentioned drawback. 
Another remarkable advantage of the scheme is that a 
shareholder can use a single string in the share of many 
different secrets. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will 
discuss the background in the basic constructs necessary 
for the foundation of the secret sharing scheme. In 
particular, this will consist of the definitions of pseudo-
random function families and universal hash function 
families. Using these basic constructs, the secret sharing 
scheme is presented in Section 3. which is followed by 
an example of the scheme in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses security and recycleability of the scheme. and 
Section 6 compares the scheme with that suggested by 
Shamir ( 1979) together with a discussion on the advant-
ages and disadvantages of the scheme, The paper lS 
closed by some remarks and conclusion in Section 7. 
2. BASIC CONSTR VCTS 
Denote by . l' the set of all positive integers. I the 
alphabet {O. I} and #S the number of elements in a set 
S. Denote by n an integer in . I' that determines many 
parameters such as the length of a shared secret, the 
length of shares. the security level of a secret sharing 
scheme and so on. In the literature such an integer 11 is 
called a security parameter. By x E RS we mean that x is 
chosen randomly and uniformly from the set S. 
We are concerned with collections offunctions induced 
by the security parameter 11. In particular. we are interes-
ted in F = Un E I F n, an infinite family of functions, where 
F" is a collection of functions from Illn) to Iml"), namely. 
Fn= UlfIlln)--+Imln):. We call F a function family map-
ping I(n)-bit input to mini-bit output strings. F is said to 
be pol.l'llomial time computahle if there is a polynomial 
time (in 11) algorithm that computes alifE F. and sampl-
ahle if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm 
that on input 11 E . l' outputs uniformly at random a 
description OffE FIJ' Note that if F= UnE \ Fn is sampl-
able. then the description of a function in Fn is 'compact' 
in the sense that the length of the description is bounded 
by a polynomial in II. 
2.1. Pseudo-random function families 
This subsection introduces the concept of pseudo-
random functions. Intuitively. a function family F = 
U" E \ Fn is a pseudo-random function family (PRFF) if 
to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. the output 
of a function f chosen randomly and uniformly from F n' 
whose description is unknown to the algorithm, appears 
to be totally uncorrelated to the input of l even if the 
algorithm can choose input for f The formal definition 
is described in terms of (uni/tinn) statistical tests fill' 
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ill!lclioll.\. ;\ luniforml statistical test for functions is a 
prohahili~tic polynomial time algorithm .4 that given n 
as input and access to an oracle 0 r for a function 
f:LIIII1_<[ItIIIII. outputs a hit 0 or 1. The algorithm A can 
query the oracle only by writing on a special tape some 
x E LIIII ( and will read the oracle answer/(.\) on a separate 
ans\\cr-tape. The oracle prints its answer in one step. 
Definition 1 Let F = lj II ( 1 FII be an infinite family of 
functions. where FII = :flfLIIIII->LnlllIl:. Assume that F is 
hoth polynomial time computable and sam pia hie. F is 
a PRFF itr for any statistical test A. for any polynomial 
Q and for all sufficiently large 11. 
( II 
where I'!' denotes the probability that A outputs I on 
input 11 and access to an oracle Or for/E RFII and 1';, the 
prohability that A outputs I on input n and access to 
an oracle 0, for a function /' chosen randomly and 
uniformly from the set of all functions from LIIIII to LIIIIIII. 
The prohahilities arc computed over all the possihle 
choices off /' and the internal coin tosses of A. 
The concept of pseudo-random functions were first 
introduced by Goldreich l't 01. ( 19R6). In the same paper 
they haw also shown that PRFFs can be constructed 
from pseudo-random string generators (Goldreich et ul .. 
1l)~61. By a result of ImpagliaZlo l't al. (19~9) and 
H~lstad (1990 I. the existence of one-way functions is 
sutlicient for the construction of pseudo-random func-
tion families. 
We are interested in a particular type of PR FFs F = 
Ivill ' I FII' where FII can be represented by FII = 
U,:,!\!ii!.\ E L". Idx:LIIIII->LnllIIl:. For such a PRFF. each 
function in FII is uniquely indexed by an l1-bit string in 
L". Thus to sclect a function from FII uniformly at 
random. we only have to choose a random l1-hit string. 
In practice. such a PRFF can be easily constructed 
from a strong data encryption algorithm. The most 
\vidcly used data encryption algorithm is perhaps the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) proposed by the 
1'iational Bureau of Standards of America ( 1977). DES 
is a strong encryption algorithm that transforms a 64-bit 
plaintext into a 64-bit ciphertext using a 56-bit key. 
Without knmving the key. the output of DES appears 
to be indistll1guishable \vith a random 64-bit string. We 
can consider DES as a set of functions. namely DES = 
: dl'S'dxlidx E LOh• dCS'd\:L 64 -> Lh4:. Each dn'dx is uniquely 
speeified by a 56-bit string idx and implements a permu-
tation on L,,4. To complete the construction of pseudo-
random function family. we can assume that there is an 
infinite family of DES-like algorithms. say DES I ..... 
DES,,,. DES'h' DES 5- ..... where each DES, is an 
encryption algorithm that is designed using the same 
principles as for designing DES 5!> (= DES) and trans-
forms an (i + R )-bit plaintext into an (i + ~ I-bit ciphertext 
using an i-bit key. 
2.2. L niwrsal hash function families 
L'l1ircrsal hash fUllction fillllilil's (UHFFs) (Carter and 
Wegman. 1979; Wegman and Carter. In I) play an 
essential role in many recent major results in crypto-
graphy and theoretical computer science (H~lStad. 1990; 
Impagliano l't 01 .. 19R9; RompcL 1990). Let H= 
UII I fIn be a family of functions mapping 1(III-bit input 
into mln)-bit output strings. For two strings x . .\' E L/[1I1 
\vith .\ # L we ~ay that .\ andy collide with each other 
under hE HII or x and.\' are sihlings under It E JIll' if 
hlx)=II(y). 
Definition 2 Let 1i = U". ,If II bc a family of func-
tions that is polynomial time computable. samplahle 
and maps I(lJi-hit input into m(II)-bit output strings. Let 
DII = Ix E Lltllll:lll E H",:l.\' E Llllilli such that 11(\)=.\': and 
R" = :.\' E Lltli/llj:lh E ll", :lx E LIIIII such that.\' = IIlx):. Let 
k~2 be a positive integer. H is a (strongly) h.-UHFF if 
for all II. for all k (distinct) strings XI' X2 ..... x, E D" and 
all k strings .\'1' .1'2 ..... Yk E R/I' there are #HII I#R,i 
functions in H" that map 'I to .\'1' X 2 to .\'2' .... and X k 
to Yk' 
An equivalent definition for the (strongly I k-universal 
hash function family is that for all k (distinct) strings 
XI' X2' .. "'k E D", when 17 is chosen uniformly at random 
from HII' the concatenation of the k resultant strings 
.1'1=171.'1) . .1'2=17(\2)' .... rk=h(xd is distributed ran-
domly and uniformly over the k-fold Cartesian product 
R~ of Rw The following collisioll ocu'ssihilitr I'rope/'tr is 
a useful one. 
Definition 3 Let H = iU" ,H" bc a family of func-
tions that is polynomial time computable. samplable 
and maps /(11)-bit input into m(lIl-bit output strings. Let 
k ~ 1 be a positive integer. 1i has the k-collision accessib-
ility property. or simply the collisio/l occl'ssihilit.\' I'rol'-
ertL if for all II and for all I ~ i ~ k. given any set X = 
:x l • x 2 • .... x,: of i strings in LIIIII. it is possible in 
probabilistic polynomial time to sclect randomly and 
uniformly functions from H;;. where H;; c HII is the set 
of all functions in HII that map XI' X 2 • .... and x, to the 
same strings in Llllini. 
k-UHFh with the collision accessibility property can 
be obtained from polynomials mer finite fields (Carter 
and Wegman. 1979: Wegman and Carter. 19R I). First 
\ve note that there is a natural one-to-one correspond-
ence between strings in LIIIII and elements in GFi 2/1111 1. 
This allows us to interchange a {(11)-bit string and an 
element in G Fi 2/111 \ l'iow denote by P II the collection of 
all polynomials over GF( 21(111) with degrees less than k. 
I.e. 
P II = :uO+uIX+··.+ilk IXk-llllo. 
a I' .... ii, _ lEG F( 211111 1: . ( 2) 
For each I' E P II' let 171' be the function obtained from () 
by chopping the first 1(11)-m(ll) bits of the output of I' 
whenever 1(11) ~ m(l1). or by appending a fixed mill) -1111)-
bit string to the output of I' whenever 1111)<111111). Let 
HII=:ilI'II'EPII :. and H=ljllc1Hw Then H is a 
strongly k-universal hash function family, \vhich maps 
I(/I)-bit input into m(n)-bit output strings and has the 
collision accessibility property. 
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3. A :\EW SECRET SHARI:\G SCHE\lE 
This section describes a new (t. \I') threshold scheme for 
\I' = O( log II). where II is the length of a secret to be 
shared. We assume that each secret K to be shared has 
a serial lIumher iIi J.:' \Ve also assume that the I\, share-
holders have identities / D 1• / D2 • .. '. / D".. respectively, 
For simplicity thc \I' shareholders will be denoted by 
['1' C· 2 ..... C'" .. respectively, In descrihing the scheme. 
we assume that there is a trusted deI/IeI' who holds a 
secret K to he shared. The scheme II ill be described in 
terms of the following three aspects: 
1. Illitial Status of the dealer and the \I' shareholders, 
') Dispersing Phase in which the dealer splits the secret 
K into \I' pieces. each of which corresponds to a 
shareholder. in such a Ivay that at least t of the pieces 
are required to reconstruct the shared secret K. 
J, Re(,()l'erillg Phase in \vhich t or more shareholders 
work together in order to reconstruct the shared 
secret K, 
3.1. Initial status 
Initially. the dealer holds an n-hit secret K to be shared 
and each shareholder L', has a II-bit secret key Ki which 
is randomly chosen by the shareholder. The dealer 
should determine a PRFF F= :F,,!II E, I: where F,,=' 
:t,d,lidx E L"'/'.i,:L1r"i--->L": and each functionf,dx E F" is 
specifled by an n-bit string idx, The dealer should also 
determine a .::-UHFF H = :H"III E, I: which is based on 
polynomials over finite fields and maps an n-bit input 
into II-bit output strings and has the collision accessibil-
ily property (sec Section 2.2). where .::. which is to be 
determined belO\v. denotes the total number of combina-
tions of the I\, shareholders taken at least t at a time, 
3.2. Dispersing phase 
Recall that the numher of ways to choose an i-element 
subset (0 ~ i ~ \I) from a II'-element set is 
(J) 
From this equation. the number of combinations of the 
II' shareholders taken at least t at a time will consist of 
the following summation: 
(4) 
Denote by B1• B2 • .... Bo the.:: different combinations 
of the II' shareholders taken at least t at a time, Note 
that 11'=()(IOgll) and that .::=O(2")=O(2,lop )=O(n') 
for some constant c. For each B i• we associate it with a 
II'-bit identity Gi, Thc;-th bit ( 1 ~j ~ w) of G, corresponds 
to the shareholder U j • and it is set to 1 if and only if U j 
is a memher of Bi , 
The core part of the secret sharing scheme is the 
following steps taken by the dealer: 
----------
1. For each set Bi (1 ~i~.::). merge the keys K". K i , ."" 
K i, of the shareholders C· ir . L"o' " .. C:,. in Bi together 
hy the usc of the following biHvise exclusive-OR 
operation: 
Xi=!J.:)I i.i, )ffi!~)I,,)ffi"·fJ.:,,(/'i,l (5) 
where j denotes the number of shareholders in B,. 
eachfJ.:,i(li.i) is provided to the dealer by shareholder 
C', and Ii,i r is the concatenation of II\. (ii and SJ.: 
(i,e, Ii,',: GilINd, It is assumed that the length in hits 
ofIi"r is 1(11). !\Iote that the secret key K , l1fsharel1nlder 
C' i is used as an index to specify a function in FI/' 
One reason for the need to use the function f is tl) 
ensure that onlv actual shareholders arc able to derive 
the string Xi' Hence an clement of authenticity. in 
that only shareholder C', knows K i• is introduced into 
the scheme. The key Ki held by shareholder ['i 
represents a share of the shared secret K, 
') Choose uniformly and randomly from H" a function 
h such that the .:: resulting \'alues X l' X 2- .... X 0 
corresponding to the sets B1• B2• " .. Ho arc mapped 
to the secret K. i.e, 
(6 ) 
1 Make the function h public along with the fact that 
h is associated Ivith the shared secret with serial 
number NJ.:. 
3.3. Recovering phase 
When the shareholders ['I!' U ,O ' " .. ['" in the set B, want 
to reconstruct the shared secret K. they put together 
f~)Ji",).f~)Ii,i). " .. f~)Ii,i,l and calculate 
Then they calculate 
K=h(X i ) 
which is the shared secret to be recovered. 
Using this method any combination of at least tout 
of the II' shareholders can get together corresponding to 
one of the sets Bi(i~'::1 while maintaining secret their 
o\vn keys through the use of f After the shared key I\. 
has been used. and thus known to the shareholders in 
set B i• it is discarded and a new key K' is selected 
together with a new function il' from H" that maps X'I' 
X~ . .... ){~ to K'. Here X;. X~ . .... X~ represents the new 
values derived from f due to the change in the serial 
number NJ.: to the new serial number iV J.: .. More details 
on these issues are presented in Section 5, 
4. AN EXA:\lPLE 
This section presents a practical example that employs 
the encryption algorithm DES = : des,tlxliJ'\ E L"h. 
des iJx:L64 ---> L6~: as a pseudo-random function, We con-
sider the case where \I' = 4 shareholders U l' L' 2. C·.1 and 
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L'~ are involved in a t = 2 secret sharing scheme. The 
total number of comhinations of four shareholders taken 
(at least) two at a time will he 
More specifically. we have the following eleven ditlcrent 
groups B I' B 2' .... B II' each has at least two shareholders: 
GI=IIOO 
G2 = 1010 
G j = IOC)] 
G~=OIIO 
G,,=OIOI 
8 6 = :C'.1' L'~:. G,,=OOII 
B-=:[·I.['2'[·.1:' (;-=1110 
8 s = :C· I. C· 2 • U~:. G8 = 1101 
8 y = :['1' C·.1' C·~:. Gq = lOll 
810= W 2• ['.1' C'~:. G111 =0111 
B 11 = : [' I' [' 2' L'.1' C' -I:' Gil = 1111. 
In the abo\t~ table G1. G2 ..... Gil are the identities of 
the groups. 
Each shareholder C';. I :S i:S 4. selects a 56-bit random 
string /\.; and keeps it secret. K 1• /\.2' K3 and /\.~ will 
participate 111 the secret sharing and recoverIng 
procedure. 
Now suppose that the dealer has a 64-bit key K which 
he \\ants to disperse into the four shareholders in such 
a 'Iva;. that two or more of the shareholders can recover 
the secret key /\. at a later stage. We further suppose 
that /\. has a 10-bit serial number Sk associated with it. 
and each shareholder C'; has a unique 50-bit identity 
! D,. Thus the length of the concatenation of a 50-bit 
shareholder identity. a 4-bit group identity and a 10-bit 
serial number is precisely 64 bits. 
The de~tler initiates the secret sharing procedure by 
informing the four shareholders the lO-bit serial number 
.\' k' Note that C; 1 is a member of 
B1. B2• B j • B-. Bx. By. B 11 . 
[:, a member of 
B1. B~. B,. Bo. BH• B IO• B11 . 
L'.1 a memher of 
B2• B-1' B". B-. By. B10• B 11 . 
and C'~ a member of 
B l. B5• Bh • BH• By. BlIJ. B 11 . 
Cpon receiving N k from the dealer. the four shareholders 
use the encryption algorithm DES to calculate the 
following 64-bit strings and pass them over to the dealer. 
L' . -I' 
Xl.l=deSkj(lDI G1 Sk) 
X1.2=des kj (lD 1,G2 Ski 
X 1..1 =deskj (lD I I Gjl i'i k ) 
Xl.o=desk pD 1 IG·I,Y k ) 
Xl. H =desk ,(lD1,IGH iNk) 
Xl.y=deskj(lDl!iCiy N k ) 
X 1.11 =deskj (lD I IG 11 I1iV k) 
X 2.1 = desk)! D211 Ci 1 II'" d 
X 2.-1 = desk)! DJG-liliVk) 
X 2." = des k2(l D211 Gsil N k) 
X 2.0 = deSk)! D211 G_II /',,' k) 
X 2.8 =desk )/ D211 GHII iV k ) 
X 2 . 1O = dcs k )!D21 Gj() IN d 
X 2.11 =deskpD2 1 G11 1Nd 
X3.2=deskpD.11 G2 Sk) 
X .1.-l=dcskpDj iIG-I'IS d 
X3.6=deskJ/D3IG61'Yk) 
X.1.o = deskp D3 I G~ ! N d 
X3.9=desk,(lDlIGyINk) 
X.1.11l = desKP Dlll G1011 iV k ) 
X j . 11 = des K ,ilD 311 Ci 11 liN d 
X -1.3 = deSk)! D-III GJij /\: k) 
X-I.5 =dcsk)lD-IIIGsIIN d 
X -1.6 = deSk)! D-III G611V k) 
X -I.S = deSk.)! D41 Cix ,S d 
X-I.y=dcs k)!D4 I Gy iNk) 
X -1.10 = deSk)! D-I I CilUl N d 
X-I.ll= deS k)!D-I G11 1,Y k ) 
After collecting all the 2R strings from the four share-
holders. the dealer derives from them II new strings. 
each corresponds to one of the II groups: 
Xl =Xl.lEBX 2.1 
)( 2 = X 1.2EBX 3.2 
X j =Xl.3EB X -I . .1 
X -I = X 2.-lEBX.1.4 
X 5 = X 2.SEBX -1.5 
X6=X3.6EBX4.h 
X 0 = X 1.·EBX 2.oEBX.1.-
X 8 = X I.XEBX 2.HEB X -l.H 
X 9 = X 1.9 EBX.1.9 EB X 4.9 
X 10 = X 2.lOEBX 3.lllEBX -1.111 
XII = X 1.11 EBX 2.11 EBX 3 . 11 EBX 4.11 
Since there are eleven different combinations (groups). 
the dealer chooses a II-UHFF H = {Il,,11l E. I} with the 
collision accessibility property. As is mentioned earlier. 
this can be done hy letting H" he the set of all uni-
variable polynomials on GF(2") with degree not larger 
than ten. Now the dealer chooses from Hb-l a random 
function h(x)=aO+alx~ ~alOxlO such that the eleven 
results Xl' X 2 • ...• XII are mapped to /\. in the following 
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way: 
110) 
I n determining h. the dealer should consider t\\n cases: 
I. The 11 strings X I' X 2' ... , X II are distinct. 
~ The II strings X l' .X' 2' .... X II are 1101 distinct. 
In the first case, the function h(\)=UO -'-(/I'+ 
+ (/1",10 is uniquely determined by solving the following 
linear equations for ao. a 1 .... (/10: 
U"+(/I X 2 + ... + (/1OX1" = K 
As the 11 strings X I' X 2' .... X 11 are distinct. the linear 
equations have a unique solution. 
I n the second case, not all the II strings Xl' X 2' ... 
. X II are distinct. Without loss of generality. suppose 
that only the first I ~I'< II strings XI' X 2 • .... Xr arc 
distinct. The dealer now chooses 11 -- I' random {A-bit 
strings X;+I ...... \"11 so that X I .X2 ..... X r .X;+I ... ·. 
X; I are all distinct. Then the dealer uses the same 
method as for the tirst case to solve a set of 11 linear 
equations for II(J. a l •.. '. (/10' This gives the function hi,) = 
(/0+ 11 1'\+ .. , +U IO,,10 
Once the function h is determined. the dealer passes 
over the description of h. namely the 11 coefficients 
u(J. Ill' .... uj(). to all the four shareholders. Alternatively. 
the dealer can make the description of II available to all 
shareholders by putting it into a public tile. This com-
pletes the dispersing phase. 
Later when two or more shareholders. say L'I and 
L' ,. want to recover the shared secret key K. they put 
together 
and 
and compute 
XI = X 1.1 EBX 2. 1· 
Now the secret key can be recovered by calculating 
After the key K is recovered. X I. X 2 ..... XII all 
become useless. as all shareholders who participated in 
the recovering procedure know the secret key K. Note 
tha t in recovering the shared secret key K. a shareholder. 
say U i • reveals only a ciphertext .Y i . to other share-
holderls). The ciphertext docs not contain useful 
information on the shareholder's secret string K i• Hence 
K i remains un-compromised and is only known to the 
shareholder ['i' This clearly indicates that even after K 
is recovered. the shareholder l, can still usc K, III tlIt: 
share of a new secret key. 
5. S E (' L R IT \: A:\ D R E C \: C L L\ HI LlI' 0 I 
THE SCHE\IE 
This section discw;ses the full(l\\ing t\\ll iSSlIl"; (111 the 
scheme: s('cIII'i1\' and r('( rc!cuhiiilr. SecuJ'lty IS m;lilll" 
concerned with the uncol11prnllll';;lhilit" of the shared 
secret agalllst the illegal enllahnration of I I shart:-
11lllders. while recycleability is concerned with the unpre-
dictability of the keys of shareholders after the 
reconstructiun of the shared secret. 
Researchers distingui,h t\\O Ineb of secllrlty of a 
secret sharing scheme. One is called illjimllllli(lil IlIe(ll'd', 
s('cllriry and the other C(!}Il111ll1lliuIllii .\('(,lIl'i1\. A i I, II) 
threshold scheme 1S illjill'll/llriull rhcurcliclil/r .IC( lire if the 
collaboration of 1-1 shareholders docs not re\eal ;111\ 
additional information on the ,hared secret in the sen~e 
of Shannon 11(49). r\ote that in this detinition 1](1 
limitation IS imposed Oil the cUll1putational p(l\VeI" (11' 
shareholders. For this reason. IJ1formatioll tht:(lretlc 
security is also called III1CUlidiliullai .ICdlrill' or pcrkll 
securilY. For many practical applicatiolls. a Iuoser secur-
ity. computational security. IS enough. A formal detilll-
tion of computational securit~ is IJ1troduced 111 the 
following. 
Consider a (I, II) threshold scheme. \\here II = 
1\'111).1 ~1=1(1l)~1\ and II is the securlt) parameter. 
Denote by .~ " the key space IJ1de\ed by II and f)" the 
probability distribution over .;\'" accmdlllg to \\ hlch 
keys from .;\"" arc chosen. Assume that the Cllmputa-
tional power of shareholders is bounded hy probabilistiC 
polynomial time. Let K be a shared secret \\hlch Is 
chosen from;\"/I according to D". Dennte by p.I!),,) till' 
probability that i( I ~ i < I) shareh"lders succeed in 
extracting the shared secret K by collaboration. and h" 
PoiD,,) the maxImum probability that a prohahilht!c 
polynomial time algorithm. which is ,marc or the prob-
ability distribution Dn' succeeds in obtainll1g K (In input 
11. Informally. a threshold scheme is computatlOllall) 
secure if the difference between the probabilities fl, and 
flo is negligible. In other \\ords. the illegal collabor,ltiun 
of i < I shareholders brings no ad\antage 111 the ntrac-
tion of the shared secret K. 
Definition" Let D" be a probabilIty distrihutinn 1111 
a key spaceW/,' A I 1.1\') thres]wld scheme IS COlllplll<l-
liollal/y .1'('('111'1' with respect to !)" if I'm ~tny pnl" 11 01 111 a I 
Q. for an: I ~i<1 and for all sutlicienth Llrgc II. 
Ifli(D,,)- Pol!),,)1 < 1 QUI). A I 1,1\) threshuld s,'heme IS 
compuIliliol1ul/r seCllre if it is c0ll1putati()Il~i11y Sl'l'lllT 
with respect to the uniform dhtributlllil ull the kl'\ 
space .~' II' 
Our secret sharing ,ch,:l11e usc, 0I1e-\\:I) funl'lilllls 111 
an essential way. therefore It C,11l llot hl' lI1rlHmatiun 
theoretically secure. We 110W pnl\e that It IS compul;l-
tionally secure. 
THI' ('O\IPl'TFR JOlR'>AL. VOL. 37. No. I Yl)4 
2{)4 Y. ZHE'JG ('( al. 
THFORE'.1 1 The (t, \\.) threshold scheme presented in 
SectlOn 3 is computationally secure for \\' = O( log II). 
Proof ]\Iote that for this scheme, the key space IS 
1( ,,= L". Therefore, when a shared secret K is chosen 
uniformly at random from 1('", we have Po(D,,) = 12", 
where D" denotes the uniform distribution on .;fn. Now 
\ve sho\\ that for any i < II and for any polynomial Q \ve 
ha\e p,(D,,) < lQ(II) for all sufficiently large /1. Suppose 
for cllntradiction that there are i < t shareholders who 
can extract by collaboration the shared secret K with 
probability l.Q(II). Since instances of the UHFF based 
on polynomials over linite fields arc easily invertible, the 
i shareholders can obtain the exclusive-OR of the outputs 
of f specified by keys unknown to the i shareholders. 
I These keys arc possessed by shareholders not collabor-
ating with the i shareholders.) This contradicts the 
un-predictability of the PRFF. From PolD,,) = 1 i2" and 
[7,iD,,) < 1 Q(II) we have Ip,(D,,) - PolD,,)1 < LQ(Il). This 
completes the proof. 
r ' LJ 
A secret sharing scheme has recycleability property if 
no information on the keys of shareholders is released 
after the re-construction of shared secrets. The 
recycleability property of our secret sharing scheme 
follows from the fact that the outputs of instances of 
PRFF on difTerent inputs look un-correlated to proba-
bilistic polynomial time algorithms. Note that 
recydeability is equivalent to the property that share-
holders can use the same keys in sharing ciifferent secrets 
simultaneously. 
6. COMPARISO;\; WITH SHA~lIR'S SCHEME 
The scheme suggested by Shamir ( 1979) consists of the 
division of a shared secret K into 1\" pieces K I , K 2 , .... 
K" and the usc of a polynomial 
p(x)=aO +a 1x+a 2x 2 + '" +(['-I X' 1 (11) 
of degree t- 1 to disperse the pieces. By placing (/n = K 
and e\aluating 
K 1 =p(ILK 2 =p(2), ... ,K,,=p(\\') (12) 
any subset of 1(1:;:; w) of the Ki values can be used to 
find the coefficients of p(x) by interpolation and the 
shared secret K contained in (/0 can then be recovered 
by simply calculating p(O)=ao=K. The calculations are 
done modulo a prime P where P > \1' and P > K, and 
the coefficients of the polynomial arc chosen randomly 
from the elements of the finite field GF(P). 
I n our scheme the concept of sharing a secret that is 
only retrievable by the collaboration of at least I share-
holders is fundamentally the same as that suggested by 
Shamir. However, an important difference lies in the fact 
that the shareholders do not hold pieces of the secret in 
the sense of Shamir's scheme. Rather, each shareholder 
holds a key, any I (at least) of which can be combined 
together to recreate the shared secret. The keys of the 
shareholders are maintained as a secret by each share-
holder in the same manner that he or she woulci maintain 
the secrecy of his or her share in Shamir\., scheme. 
Inherent in our approach is the advantage that the secret 
key of a shareholder can be selected by him or her. and 
can be used many times independent pf the shared secret. 
Another advantage of our approach is the variable 
length in bits of the shared secret K. In general the 
shared secret K can be polynomially longer than that of 
the secret key Ki of each shareholder L'i' This ccmpares 
favorably with Shamir's scheme where the shared key K 
and the key Ki of the shareholder L', arc of eLjual iength 
A further advantage lies in the fact that our scheme 
can be easily adapted to a gelleral (/('('css strllctllrc. The 
notion ofa general access structure refers to the situation 
where a secret can be dividl:'d among a set of shareholders 
such that any "qualilicd subset' of the shareholders can 
reconstruct the secret while the unqualified suhsets 
cannot (Ito et (//., 1987: Benaloh and Leichter. 19(0). 
The (t. \\") threshold scheme is in fact only a special case 
of the general access structure. It is not clear ho\\ 
Shamir's threshuld scheme can be adapted to a general 
access structure. 
Our scheme has a disadnllltage in the small number 
of shareholders II', i.e. \\" = Ollog 11), where II is the length 
in bits pf the shared secret K. Recti! that the number of 
combinations of the 1\' shareholders taken at least I at a 
time is 
( 13) 
which is of order O( 2"l In generaL for a :-uni\ersal 
hash function family 11 = : H)/1 E I :' the size of a 
description of a function liE H" is of order 0(11'.::) = 
0(11'2"') which grows exponentially with \\" where (' is a 
constant. For practical purposes we must maintain the 
sile of the description of h to be of order O(II J ) for some 
constant d. ThIS means that we must keep \I' to he of 
order II' = 0 (log II) for the scheme to he practical. 
However, this restriction does not render the scheme 
unusable since many practical situations require a small 
number of shareholders. This is particularly true in the 
case of a vault in a bank where the authority to open 
the vault of a hank director may be distributed among 
a small number of II' managers in the form of shares of 
the key K to the vault. Then at least I of the II (t:;:; \I') 
managers would be required in order to open the vault 
when the director is unavailable. 
7. CO;\;CLlTSIO:\, A:\,D RE'IARKS 
In this paper we have presented a simple secret sharing 
scheme based on the PR FF (Goldreich el (//., 1986) and 
on the UHFF (Carter and Wegman, 1979). The scheme 
employs combinations of I\" shareholders taken at least 
t at a time. These different combinations form a number 
cJ sets of shareholders, each of which represents an 
individual input to an instance of the universal hash 
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function family \vhich maps the inputs to the desired 
shared secret. The advantage of our approach lies in the 
freedom of each shareholder to choo~e his or her own 
~ecret key (corresponding to his or her 'piece' of the 
shared secret) and in the reusability of his or her secret 
kcy which is not compromised even when the shared 
sccret is recreated by t or more shareholders. 
Our approach to secret sharing has opened a number 
of avcnues for further research. These include research 
into linding schemes that will remove the restrictions on 
the size of I\" and into other mathematical constructs 
suitable for the formation of secret sharing schemes 
having recyclable shares. 
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